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Abstract 
“Conceptual coordination” analysis bridges connectionism and symbolic 
approaches by positing a “process memory” by which categories are physically 
coordinated (as neural networks) in time. Focusing on dysfunctions and odd 
behaviors like slips reveals the function of consciousness, especially taken-for- 
granted constructive processes, different from conventional programming 
constructs. Newell strongly endorsed identifying architectural limits; the heuristic 
of “diagnose unusual behaviors” will provide targets of opportunity that greatly 
strengthens the Newell Test. 
Anderson and Lebiere’s (A&L) article evaluates cognitive theories by relating them to 
criteria of functionality derived from Newell. Suppose that NT has all the right 
categories, but a significant architectural change is required for theoretical progress. I 
claim that “conceptual coordination” (Clancey 1999a) provides a better theory of  
memory, and that without committing to explaining cognitive dysfunctions, NT would 
not provide sufficient heuristic guidance for leading in this direction. 
Conceptual coordination (CC) hypothesizes that the store, retrieve, and copy memory 
mechanism is not how the brain works. Instead, all neural categorizations are activated, 
composed, and sequenced “in place,” with the assumption that sufficient (latent) physical 
connections exist to enable necessary links to be formed (physically constructed) at 
runtime (i.e., when a behavior/experience occurs). For example, if comprehending a 
natural language sentence requires that a noun phrase be incorporated in different ways, it 
is not moved or copied, but physically connected by activation of (perhaps heretofore 
unused) neural links. Effectively, Newell’s “distal access’‘ is accomplished by a 
incorporated in different ways in a single construction. The no-copying constraint tums 
out to be extremely powerful for explaining a wide variety of odd behaviors, including 
speaking and typing slips, perceptual aspects of analogy formation, developmental “felt 
paths,” multimodal discontinuity in dreams, and language comprehension limitations. CC 
~~~~~~~~~ to ho!d 3 cctegorizatior; active ~ i c f  ~ ~ c ~ p j ~ l ~ t e  it (like 2 p6ifitei-j 50 it be 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060018394 2019-08-29T21:45:58+00:00Z
+L.., Lllua specifies I- a cogiitive ai-chitectiire that bridges corfiectioiiist ai16 sji~iibolic coiiceixs, 
and relates well to the NT criteria for which ACT-R scores weakest-development, 
consciousness, language, and the brain. To illustrate, I provide a diagnostic analysis of an 
autistic phenomenon, and then relate this back to how NT can be improved. 
In CC analysis, a diagram notation is used to represent a behavior sequence, which 
corresponds in natural language to the conceptualization of a sentence. For example, 
according to (Baron-Cohen 1996), an autistic child can conceptualize “I stroke the cat 
that drinks the milk.” In one form of the CC notation, a slanting line to the right 
represents categorizations activated sequentially in time (e.g., “I 3 stroke” in Figure 1). 
Another sequence may qualify a categorization (e.g., “the cat + drinks” qualifies 
“stroke”). This pattern of sequences with qualifying details forming compositions of 
sequences is occurs throughout CC analysis. The essential idea in CC is to understand 
how categories (both perceptual categorizations and higher-order categorizations of 
sequences and compositions of them) are related in time to constitute conscious 
experience (Clancey 1999a). 
Figure 1. Unproblematic: “I stroke the cat that drinks the milk.” 
The challenge is to understand why an autistic child finds it problematic to conceptualize 
“I see the cat that sees the mouse.” A traditional view is that the child lacks “social 
understanding.” But CC analysis suggests a mechanistic limitation in the child’s ability to 
physically sequence and compose categories. Relating to other agents requires being able 
to construct a 2nd order conceptualization that relates the child’s activity to the other 
agent’s activity. Figure 2 shows the CC notation for the required construction. 
/ the mouse 
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Figure 2. Problematic: “I s e e  the cat that sees the mouse.” 
The statement (the conceptualization being constructed) involves a triadic relation: I see 
the cat, the cat sees the mouse, and I see the mouse. There is one mouse that we are both 
seeing. Two “see” constructions are unified by identifying a detail (the mouse) as 
common to both. In effect, the child must conceive of a problem space (Clancey 1999a): 
A common categorization of an operand (mouse) enables categorization of multiple 
actions as being one action (seeing), an operator. Because the two actions are by different 
agents, accomplishing this identification integrates perspectives of “self’ (what I am 
doing now) m d  “othe~” (what that object is doiiig m ~ ) .  Iiideed, the concept-iis:izatioii of 
agent appears to be inherent in this construction. 
Put another way, two sequentially occumng conceptualizations (I see the cat; the cat sees 
the mouse) are held active and related: “I see the cat that sees the mouse” and “I see the 
mouse” becomes “see that the cat sees the mouse (i,e., the mouse that I am seeina) ” 
(the second order relation is represented in Figure 2 by the solid arrow below “I see”). 
Conceiving this relation is tantamount to conceiving what joint action is. Barresi and 
Moore (1996) characterize this as “integrating third and first person information” (p. 
148), and contrast it with (Figure 1) “embedding one third person representation in a 
separate first person frame” (p. 148). Related to Langacker’s (1986) analysis, !ogica! 
relations are not extra capabilities or meta “inference” capabilities, but generalizations of 
concrete accomplishments that arise through the capability to physically coordinate 
categories through identification, sequence, and composition in time. Mental operations 
are physical, subconscious processes, constrained by physical limits on how inclusion in 
new sequences can occur. The ability to hold two sequences active and relate them 
constitutes a certain kind of consciousness (e.g., not present in dreaming; Clancey 2000). 
To summarize, the example requires relating sequential categorizations of seeing so they 
become simultaneous; it exemplifies a 2”d order conceptualization of intentionality (my 
seeing is about your seeing; Clancey 1999b); and suggests that joint action requires being 
able to conceive the ideas we call operator and agent. 
The pivotal heuristic in CC analysis is addressing ‘‘unusual’’ behaviors and experiences. 
These “targets of opportunity” appear to be deemphasized by A&L’s focus on normal 
behaviors “that people display on a day-to-day basis.” For NT to provide heuristic 
guidance for discovering a theory like CC, grading for each criteria should include 
diagnosing unusual phenomena that everyone experiences (e.g., slips) and dysfunctions. 
For example, for the criteria of Consciousness, we should direct theorization at 
explaining the phenomenology of dreaming, autism, compulsive-obsessive disorders, etc. 
For Natural Language, include comprehension difficulties (e.g., subject relatives with 
center-embedded noun phrases; Clancey 1999a, chapter 10). For Development, explain 
how “felt paths” are constructed in children’s learning (chapter 5). For Knowledge 
Integration, explain slips (chapter 6) and “seeing as” in analogy formation (chapter 7). In 
this manner, learning in well-known architectures (e.g., MOPS, EPAM, SOAR) can be 
evaluated and the nature of problem spaces reformulated (chapter 12). 
The Evolution criterion highlights the limitations of NT as stated. Rather than focusing 
on human evolution, this criterion should be about the evolution of cognition broadly 
construed, and hence should be inherently comparative across species (Clancey 1999b). 
Viewed this way, there is no “paucity of data,” but rather a largely unexploited potential 
LU iriiiire the s’iildy of mina i  cognition an integrated discipline with h m m  problem 
solving. By including the heuristic “explain odd behavior” in the grading, we will 
naturally be guided to characterize and relate cognition in other primates, ravens, etc. 
This is essential for relating “instinctive” mechanisms (e.g., weaving spider webs) to 
brain mechanisms, development, and learned higher-order categorizations (e.g., 
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conceptuaiization of intentionality). A & i  mention comparative considerations, but we 
should view this as a diagnostic problem, much as cognitive theories like ACT* have 
been used to explain students’ different capabilities (Anderson et al., 1990). Furthermore, 
the research community should collect behaviors that have been heretofore ignored or 
poorly explained by computational theories, and include them in the grading criteria. 
Applying the Newel1 Test in this way-moving from the routine behaviors already 
handled more or less well, to diagnostic theories that relate aberrations to architectural 
variations-might bring symbolic and connectionist theories together and make the study 
of cognition a more mature science. 
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